Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps displaying Iranian-made ‘Zolfaghar’ missiles © Tasnim News
In a twist of fate, the winds of change have swept through the corridors of power in Iran. The unexpected death of President Ebrahim Raisi and his foreign minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian in a helicopter crash in mid-May triggered a political transition that has baffled both domestic and international analysts.
Masoud Pezeshkian, a man of humble demeanour has risen to the second highest office in the land, ultimate authority resting firmly with the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.
The death of the two key figures, particularly in the context of a visit by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Rafael Grossi to Tehran on 6 May, has had a profound impact on Iran’s nuclear programme and the country’s relations with the international community. It has raised questions about the future direction of Iran’s nuclear policy. The country’s theocratic leadership, already facing internal challenges and international pressure, now finds itself at a critical juncture.
Iran’s new president is its first self-described ‘reformist’ in nearly twenty years. Masoud Pezeshkian is a 69-year-old heart surgeon who served as health minister in the Khatami administration in the early 2000s. In the early stages of his presidential campaign, he struggled to gain momentum and came across as lacklustre in televised debates. Despite his experience in the Ministry of Health, his name recognition at the national level was low and many considered him inexperienced for the job. Even high-profile supporters such as Khatami and other reformists, former political prisoners and well-known intellectuals failed to provide him with significant support.
Voter turnout in the first round was historically low at just 39.9%. Many Iranians either refused to legitimise the system or were disillusioned that the presidency would have no impact on their daily lives due to the overriding authority of the Supreme Leader and other centres of power. Pezeshkian’s luck began to turn, however, when the system’s favoured candidate, former Tehran mayor and current speaker of the Majles (parliament), Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, performed poorly amid allegations of corruption, receiving only 14% of the vote.
In the political history of the Islamic Republic, almost every president has clashed with the Supreme Leader when trying to push through a personal agenda.
Pezeshkian however, recognised the constraints of the presidency and decided to tackle the issue head on by openly acknowledging the limits of his authority to the electorate. He emphasised that he was not a miracle worker and could only bring about change in areas under his direct control. For areas outside his remit, he promised to negotiate on behalf of the people and work constructively with the established interests within the system rather than confront them.
In his first public reaction to his victory, he took to the social media platform X (formerly Twitter): “The difficult path ahead will be rough without your cooperation, empathy and trust. I extend a hand to you and swear upon my honour that I will not abandon you on this path. Do not abandon me”.
| SETTING THE TONE
During his campaign, Pezeshkian focused on three main areas, even if his proposals were not very detailed. The first area was civil liberties, where he opposed the increasing restrictions on the public sphere by hardline conservatives, such as stricter regulations on women’s dress, gender relations, censorship laws and the threat of a restricted national internet. He promised to do everything in his power to reverse these trends.
With regard to Iran’s economic challenges, Pezeshkian emphasised the urgent need to combat rapidly rising inflation, which exceeded 40% throughout 2023 and early 2024. With the support of a strong coalition of political and economic interests, he proposed a series of measures to tackle the crisis. These included liberalising markets, downsizing the state sector, stemming capital flight from the middle class, strengthening the private sector over the cronyism-ridden parastatal sector and attracting foreign investment.
And then, there was of course, foreign policy, which in the eyes of many is closely linked to Iran’s ailing economy. Pezeshkian promised to save the nuclear deal, free Iran from crippling sanctions and reduce tensions with the US and Europe. To achieve this, he argued for a firm stance against radicals seeking to undermine the negotiations, for prioritising expertise over ideology, for improving relations with regional neighbours and for creating more balanced relations between Eastern and Western powers.
However, it should be noted that as far as foreign policy is concerned, there is no indication that the core principles of the Islamic Republic’s security doctrine are negotiable. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and prominent figures within the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) have spent decades building what is known as the ‘axis of resistance’, which they see as a critical component of the Islamic Republic’s ability to protect the country from external threats and foreign interference. While a turn to proactive diplomacy may lead to some de-escalation and potentially positive outcomes, it will most likely not change this fundamental aspect of the country’s defence strategy.
| A THORN IN THE FLESH
For almost two decades, Iran’s nuclear programme has been a source of global consternation and diplomacy, with much at stake. Despite numerous rounds of negotiations, sanctions and international pressure, Iran has continued its uranium enrichment activities undeterred, repeatedly crossing the red lines set by the international community.
Iran began its nuclear programme in the 1950s with the support of the United States as part of the “Atoms for Peace” initiative. However, it was only after the Islamic revolution of 1979, that the programme was significantly expanded, raising concerns about its possible military dimensions.
After years of evasions and cover-ups, Iran finally admitted in 2002 that it had secretly built uranium enrichment facilities. This revelation and Iran’s refusal to comply with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards led to a protracted stand-off with the international community.
In 2015, Iran concluded a landmark nuclear agreement with the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia and China, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The agreement provides for strict restrictions on Iran’s nuclear activities in return for the lifting of sanctions.
However, the fragile nuclear agreement began to falter in 2018 when the United States unilaterally withdrew from the agreement and re-imposed tough economic sanctions on Iran. Iran then began to systematically violate the restrictions of the JCPOA and steadily increase its uranium enrichment.
In line with its nuclear policy, Iran began enriching uranium to 20 % at the beginning of 2021 and increased this to 60 % in April 2021. This level of enrichment goes well beyond what is normally required for civilian use.
| MISSILES
In July 2021, the IAEA confirmed that Iran had started producing uranium metal, a material with limited civilian use but relevant for the development of nuclear weapons. And in early 2023, the agency reported that uranium particles enriched to 83,7% had been detected at the Fordow nuclear facility. In response, Iran suggested that there may have been ‘unintended fluctuations in enrichment levels’ during a transition phase of centrifuge operation.
Despite the fact that in his quarterly report for September 2023, the IAEA Director General said that the agency had accepted Iran’s explanation, the United States, Germany, France and the UK called the developments “extremely grave” and one that “further strengthened the view that there is no credible justification for Iran’s nuclear programme”.
| CONDEMNATIONS AND REPRIMANDS
On 5 June, the United States joined its European counterparts in reprimanding Iran at the United Nations Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This step was taken despite the Biden administration’s fears that an official censure of Tehran could lead to further nuclear escalation.
The resolution was presented to the IAEA’s 35-member governing board by Germany, France and the UK – referred to as the E3 – at the start of its quarterly meeting in June. Director General, Rafael Grossi said at the start of the meeting that despite his visit to Tehran in May, he deeply regretted that Iran had not yet reversed its decision to expel the agency’s experienced inspectors.
He also noted that there has been no progress in resolving the outstanding safeguards issues. Iran has failed to provide convincing technical explanations on the uranium particles of anthropogenic origin detected at the Varamin and Turquzabad sites. Furthermore, Iran has not informed the Agency of the location of the nuclear material and equipment contaminated with uranium particles.
The resolution which criticises Iran for its lack of cooperation with the nuclear inspectors, was therefore adopted by the Board of Governors of the IAEA in Vienna. The result of the vote was 20 in favour, Russia and China were against and 12 members abstained.
Unsurprisingly, Iran promptly denounced the resolution: “The Western countries’ decision was hasty and unwise and will undoubtedly have a detrimental effect on the process of diplomatic engagement and constructive cooperation [between Iran and the opposing parties]”,” state television quoted the Iranian mission to the United Nations as saying.
It should be noted that even though censure resolutions by the IAEA governing board are not legally binding, it was widely believed by both diplomats and nuclear experts that failure by the IAEA to pass a resolution against Iran would jeopardise the organisation’s authority as a nuclear watchdog and undermine the West’s credibility in dealing with potential proliferation threats.
| JCPOA, VERSION 2
With the new president Masoud Pezeshkian declaring during his election campaign that he wants to work towards lifting US sanctions against Iran, would it be advisable for the United States and Europe to continue negotiations on a new nuclear agreement with the new Iranian government?
It is obvious that the lifting of sanctions against important sectors of the Iranian economy, such as the energy sector, requires a new agreement with the West on the country’s nuclear activities. And Pezeshkian wasn’t the only one to discuss the need to revitalise the nuclear agreement. The Director General of the IAEA, Rafael Grossi, also emphasised the need to find a replacement for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which has been largely disregarded.
But given the ever-changing dynamics that can have global effects – including the Ukraine conflict, social movements, the war in Gaza, even the assassination attempt on Donald Trump that will undoubtedly reshape the upcoming US presidential election, and the fact that Iran is operating largely unhindered – is it even possible to reach a new nuclear agreement between Iran and the five major powers concerned (United Kingdom, China, France, Russia and the United States) plus Germany?
Given the current state of the talks, which could potentially pave the way for a return to the JCPOA – from which the United States withdrew in 2018 under Donald Trump’s administration and reimposed unilateral sanctions – there has been minimal to no progress. This, coupled with the fact that most of the restrictions on Iran set out in the nuclear deal will be lifted by October 2025 – the last date until which the West can impose “retroactive” sanctions – makes a return to the JCPOA highly unlikely, despite Grossi’s claims.
Nevertheless, considering the urgent need for the parties to prevent uncontrolled deterioration and escalation, they have continued their dialogue in Oman to prevent a regional escalation, following the events of 7 October 2023 in Gaza.
At any rate, the possibility of revisiting the JCPOA is expected to resurface after the United States presidential election in November, especially in light of Pezeshkian’s victory in Iran and the looming October 2025 deadline.
Consequently, Tehran and the relevant world powers must explore the potential for a new political framework to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue, otherwise the likelihood of an unprecedented crisis between the United States and Iran will increase significantly. However, given the unsuccessful attempts to reinstate the JCPOA and the deep historical mistrust between the parties, the question arises as to what kind of agreement can be reached when Iran’s nuclear programme has evolved in such a highly negative fashion since the original agreement was signed in 2015.
Iran has significantly ramped up its uranium enrichment capabilities. It is currently using state-of-the-art centrifuges to achieve an enrichment level of 60 per cent and has amassed a substantial stockpile of enriched uranium. This progress requires a reassessment of the concessions Iran could make in a future nuclear agreement. The situation is further complicated by the recent expansion of Iran’s enrichment facility at Fordow, a move that came in response to the condemnation by the IAEA Board of Governors in May, which criticised Iran’s lack of cooperation in resolving outstanding issues with the IAEA. These developments highlight the potential risks if diplomatic efforts do not lead to an agreement.
Reaching a new agreement will undoubtedly require complex and demanding negotiations, but without a new agreement, Iran’s nuclear programme is likely to continue unchecked. This scenario significantly increases the risk of a confrontation between Iran and Western powers, first and foremost the United States. The looming spectre of conflict could give all parties the necessary impetus to return to the negotiating table with renewed determination to find common ground.
| DANGER AHEAD
Over the past four and a half decades, Western nuclear sanctions against Iran have caused enormous economic damage, possibly running into the trillions of dollars. Yet these punitive measures have failed to achieve their main objective: to prevent Iran from developing the capability for rapid nuclear weaponisation. This protracted strategy of pressure and counter-pressure in relation to Iran’s nuclear ambitions has produced no winners and leaves both Iran and Western states at a disadvantage.
Two key factors now define the impasse: Western powers are unwilling to offer Iran economic compensation for its losses, and Iran remains unwilling to give up the strategic leverage its nuclear capabilities represent without significant concessions. This stalemate emphasises the need for a new approach that takes into account the core interests of all parties involved.
In its Resolution 2231, the UN Security Council set October 2025 as the deadline for finalising the Iranian nuclear dossier. Before this date, the European powers still have the option of triggering the “snapback” mechanism, which would reinstate all previous UN Security Council sanctions against Iran. However, such a move could provoke a drastic reaction from Tehran, possibly leading to a complete withdrawal from the JCPOA and the suspension of its status as a non-nuclear weapon state under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Should this scenario materialise and Israel and/or the United States carry out military attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities, Iran could escalate by seeking nuclear weaponisation. This chain of events could transform the current standoff into a situation reminiscent of tensions with North Korea, where deterrence through nuclear capabilities becomes a central factor in geopolitical relations.
This potential development emphasises the delicate balance of current diplomatic efforts and the high stakes involved in navigating the complex landscape of international nuclear policy.
Over the next 15 months, the United States and the European Union will be faced with a crucial decision on Iran’s nuclear status, and this essentially boils down to two different outcomes:
- A country that fully crosses the nuclear threshold, like North Korea.
- A country positioned as a nuclear threshold state, similar to Japan’s latent nuclear capability.
This timeframe represents a crucial phase in shaping the future of regional security and global non-proliferation efforts, and whichever decision is taken will have far-reaching implications for international relations, stability in the Middle East and the global nuclear order.
A revised version of the JCPOA, while not flawless, may improve the ability of Western states to monitor Iran’s nuclear activities and ensure that they are exclusively for peaceful purposes, even though the cost of lifting sanctions will be significant. Originally, the United States intended to maintain the sanctions as a bargaining chip to be used as leverage for Iran’s compliance with the nuclear pact.
However, as long as Supreme Leader Khamenei remains in power – and it is conceivable that an agreement can only be reached with him and not with any other politician, including President Masoud Pezeshkian – he will guarantee that no agreement will allow the penetration of Western ideologies into the Iranian population.
Furthermore, Iran will likely continue to arm its conventional forces, including ballistic missiles and drones, and will not be open to negotiations on its relations with its allies in the Middle East. Any international interference in these matters is a red line for Iran and it will not accept any restrictions on its relations with any ally as part of any agreement. Iran has made its position clear from the beginning: a limitation to what it calls a “peaceful” nuclear programme in return for the lifting of sanctions and nothing more.
| TIME FOR DARING
Even if the world powers agree to these principles, it will not be easy to reach an agreement. The mistrust between Washington and Tehran will persist regardless of the leadership of the two countries. Nevertheless, the realisation that the dispute over Iran’s nuclear programme is virtually inevitable without a further comprehensive agreement could prevail. By demanding concessions from both sides, the motivation to prevent further escalation may increase the chances of a revised JCPOA that benefits both the Middle East and the global community.
Both Russia and China have closer relations with Iran, and have sought to reconcile their own strategic interests with the imperative of preventing nuclear proliferation. However, their willingness to support strict international sanctions has been a point of contention.
Meanwhile, Israel, which sees an Iranian nuclear weapon as an existential threat, has hinted at the possibility of unilateral military action to prevent Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold. This has further complicated the diplomatic landscape and raised the spectre of a regional conflagration.
As the Iranian nuclear crisis continues to simmer, the international community faces a huge challenge: how to effectively contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions without resorting to military conflict or further destabilising the region
More and more experts believe that a renewed diplomatic push, combined with a credible threat of consequences, could be the best way forward. This could include a return to the JCPOA framework with stronger verification mechanisms and longer-term commitments from all parties.
Alternatively, some have suggested that a broader regional security arrangement involving Iran’s neighbours and other key players may be necessary to resolve the underlying geopolitical tensions that have fuelled the nuclear standoff.
Ultimately, resolving the Iranian nuclear issue will require a delicate balance between deterrence, diplomacy and regional cooperation – a task that has proven elusive for decades, but one that the international community cannot afford to miss.
